TORAH: It's NOT Just The Five Books of Moses

Isaiah 29:13 "Wherefore the Lord said, Forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips do honor me, but have removed their heart far from me, and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men...."  We are commanded to KNOW G-d, not merely to believe that He exists.  This web-site is dedicated to the study and dissemination of KNOWLEDGE of G-d and His Torah.

THE ORAL LAW

The Torah, given to the Jewish people at Mt. Sinai, consisted  of two distinct elements: an  all encompassing "Oral" Teaching, and an outline of that Teaching, commonly know as the Torah.  It is this "Written" Law/Torah/Teaching, received through the pen of Moses, that has been given the most "press" (as it is accepted as G-d's Word by all of the "off-shoots" from Judaism over the last 2000 years), but it is the Oral Element of the Revelation at Mt. Sinai which, in reality, truly defines Judaism and distinguished between the Jew and his non-Jewish neighbors.

Part of the Oral Torah is a set of rules by which the Torah could be analyzed and applied to situations that might arise (Deuteronomy 17:8 If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates: then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the LORD thy God shall choose; 9 And thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and enquire; and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment: 10 And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place which the LORD shall choose shall shew thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: 11 According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left.)  These rules of hermeneutical interpretation were codified by Rabbi Yishmael....

Rabbi Yishmael's Thirteen Principles of Torah Interpretation

Each morning, included in the morning prayer (Shacharis), is a section from the Gemara which enumerates the rules by which the Torah, Prophets, and Writings may be expounded upon. This section, a baraisa [literally "outside", as this was included in the Mishnaic material that was not included by R' Yehuda in the codified Mishnah] by R' Yishmael, is a list of exegetical rules used by the Sages to delve into the meanings of the Jewish Scriptures. A baraisa, though not part of the codified Mishnah, is authoritative, and baraisos are often cited by the Gemara as evidence for a position taken by a rabbi debating the halachah of one situation or another. These thirteen rules are called d'rash, implying the "investigation" or "seeking out" of the inner riches contained within the verses of the Torah and Nach.

The thirteen rules are:

Rabbi Yishmael says: "Through thirteen rules is the Torah elucidated:

1) "Through a conclusion inferred from a lenient law to a strict one, and vice versa (a kal vachomer);

2) "through tradition that similar words in different contexts are meant to clarify one another (a g'zarah shavah);

3) "through a general principle derived from one verse, and a general principle derived from two verses (a binyan av or mah matzinu);

4) "through a general statement limited by a specification (a c'lal ufrat);

5) "through a specification broadened by a general statement (a p'rat uchlal);

6) "through a general statement followed by a specification followed, in turn, by another general statement -- you may infer whatever is similar to the specification (a c'lal ufrat uchlal);

7) "when a general statement requires a specification or a specification requires a general statement to clarify its meaning (a c'lal shehu tzarich lefrat);

8) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was singled out from the general statement in order to teach something, was not singled out to teach only about itself, but to apply its teaching to the entire generality (a cal davar shehayah bechlal v'yatza ... l'lamad ...);

9) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to discuss a provision similar to the general category, has been singled out to be more lenient rather than more severe (a ... v'yatza leton ... ch'enyon ...);

10) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to discuss a provision not similar to the general category, has been singled out both to be more lenient and more severe (a ... v'yatza leton ... shelo ch'enyon ...);

11) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to be treated as a new case, cannot be returned to its general statement unless Scripture returns it explicitly to its general statement (a ... v'yatza ledon ...);

12) "a matter elucidated from its context, or from the following passage (a davar halamad maenyon);

13) "similarly, two passages that contradict one another -- until a third passage comes to reconcile them (a sh'nai ch'suvim ...)."

                                                   (from the Art Scroll Hebrew/English Siddur)

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Now we shall delve further into the 13 Rules, giving examples of these rules "in action":

Rabbi Yishmael says: "Through thirteen rules is the Torah elucidated:

1) (a kal vachomer) "Through a conclusion inferred from a lenient law to a strict one, and vice versa;

A kal vachomer is a logical rule which states that if a lenient case has a stringency, that stringency must also apply to a stricter case. In other words, a law can be derived from less obvious cases and applied to case which are more obvious. An example: IF it is forbidden to pluck an apple from a tree on a festival (Yom Tov) [when the cooking of food is not prohibited as it is on the Sabbath: Exodus 12:16 And in the first day there shall be an holy convocation, and in the seventh day there shall be an holy convocation to you; no manner of work shall be done in them, save that which every man must eat, that only may be done of you.] THEN the plucking of fruit is certainly prohibited on the Sabbath itself. Alternately: IF one is permitted to slice vegetables on the Sabbath, THEN one is assuredly permitted to slice vegetables on a Yom Tov.

2) (a g'zarah shavah) "through tradition that similar words in different contexts are meant to clarify one another;

A g'zarah shavah states that, in limited cases that have been handed down generation to generation from Mt. Sinai, two laws or cases that are seemingly independent of each other, are in reality meant to illuminate each other. There are two ways that indicate two cases or laws are complimentary; (a) a word, either similar or the same, appears in both case; for example: the word bimoado ("in its proper time") [Numbers 28:2 Command the children of Israel, and say unto them, My offering, and my bread for my sacrifices made by fire, for a sweet savour unto me, shall ye observe to offer unto me in their due season.] is used to determine that the daily offerings are brought, even on the Sabbath. Likewise, the same word, used in the context of the Pesach-Offering [Numbers 9:2 Let the children of Israel also keep the passover at his appointed season.] is interpreted as meaning that it is offered even if Passover falls on a Sabbath (see Pesachim 66a); (b) when two differing topics are placed in close proximity (this is also called hekash ["comparison"]); for example: many laws dealing with divorce and betrothal, and the processes thereof, are derived each from the other as Scripture [Deuteronomy 24:2 And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife.] mentions divorce and betrothal in the same sentence. The proximity of theses to concepts implies that both marriage and divorce are achieved through similar processes.

3) (a binyan av or mah matzinu) "through a general principle derived from one verse, and a general principle derived from two verses;

A binyan av teaches us that a general principle derived from one case is applicable to all cases that are logically similar in circumstances. This rule is also known as a mah matzinu ("what do we find?"). Example: Torah teaches us that one may not marry his maternal half-sister; this binyan av tells us that similarly, this prohibition against marrying the sister of one's father applies also to one's father's maternal half-sister (see Yevamos 54b). This rule is applicable when two differing verses illuminate each other. Also, similar laws may be derived from a combination of the two different verses.

4) (a c'lal ufrat) "through a general statement limited by a specification;

A c'lal ufrat states that in a situation where a generality is followed by a specific situation, the rule is only applied to the specific situation. Example: the list of animals that are eligible to brought as sacrificial offerings states: [Leviticus 1:2] Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, If any man of you bring an offering unto the LORD, ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd, and of the flock; the Torah teaches us that only cattle, sheep, and goats may be used as offerings, none other. In this case, the general statement regarding domesticated animals is stated only to to teach us that no other members of these species are included except for the animals listed.

5) (a p'rat uchlal) "through a specification broadened by a general statement;

A p'rat uchlal is the opposite of the c'lal ufrat. When obligating us to return lost articles, Torah states [Deuteronomy 22:3]: You shall do the same with a neighbor's donkey; you shall do the same with a neighbor's garment; and you shall do the same with anything else that your neighbor loses and you find. You may not withhold your help. From this we conclude the generality that there are no exceptions to this rule proscribing us to return a found object.

6) (a c'lal ufrat uchlal) "through a general statement followed by a specification followed, in turn, by another general statement -- you may infer whatever is similar to the specification;

The nuance between c'lal ufrat uchlal a and a c'lal ufrat (rule #4), is that with a c'lal ufrat uchlal the verse ends with a general statement. When we have two general statement, the implication is that everything is included while the specifics in the middle of the verse imply that only they are included. This leave us with an apparent contradiction, but we resolve it this way: everything IS included, providing the thing is similar in essence to the specified items. Example: the Torah teaches us in one verse that a fine is imposed on a thief; within the verse we find two general terms [Exodus 22:8]: For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for donkey, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour, which imply that a thief is liable no matter what he has stolen. However, we find between these two general phrases, several specific items [Exodus 22:8]: For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for donkey, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour. We learn from this that the thief is fined for any moveable object of some value, but NOT for real estate, as it is not moveable, or for contracts, which are given a proof of a debt, but in of themselves have no intrinsic value (see Bava Metzia 57b).

7) (a c'lal shehu tzarich lefrat) "when a general statement requires a specification or a specification requires a general statement to clarify its meaning;

A c'lal shehu tzarich lefrat informs us that neither a c'lal ufrat nor a p'rat uchlal (rules #4 & #5) apply to a case in which an introductory general statement or specification deed further clarification in order to be clear. Example: Torah commands that after one slaughters a fowl, or a non-domesticated kosher animal [Leviticus 17:13]: And whatsoever man there be of the children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among you, which hunteth and catcheth any beast or fowl that may be eaten; he shall even pour out the blood thereof, and cover it with dust. This generalization -- the commandment to cover the blood with dust/dirt -- is in need of further clarification as it could be taken to mean that the blood could be poured into a covered pot, or covered over with some other solid besides dirt. The clarifying statement "with dust/dirt" is necessary to clarify that the blood must be covered with a soft, porous substance that is easily mixed with blood. Thus, this statement is not a 'specification' as depicted in rule #4, but rather is a clarifying statement (see Chullin 88b).

8) (a cal davar shehayah bechlal v'yatza ... l'lamad ...) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was singled out from the general statement in order to teach something, was not singled out to teach only about itself, but to apply its teaching to the entire generality;

A cal davar shehayah bechlal v'yatza ... l'lamad ... is most opportunely described by an example: The Torah teaches [Leviticus 7:19]: And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire: and as for the flesh, all that be clean shall eat thereof. The very next verse states [Leviticus 7:20]: But the soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain unto the LORD, having his uncleanness upon him, even that soul shall be cut off from his people. We learn from this that the peace-offering is not an exception to the general rule, but that the punishment for one offering is representative of the punishment for eating any offering in a condition of ritual impurity.

9) (a ... v'yatza leton ... ch'enyon ...) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to discuss a provision similar to the general category, has been singled out to be more lenient rather than more severe;

A ... v'yatza leton ... ch'enyon ... is also best defined through an illustration from the Torah. The Torah imposes the death penalty on a murderer [Leviticus 24:21 And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it: and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death,] but the Torah does not make a differentiation between a willful murder and a case of unintentional manslaughter. Then, Torah depicts a person chopping wood in a careless manner, and a bystander is killed by a piece of flying wood [Deuteronomy 19:5 As when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour, that he die; he shall flee unto one of those cities, and live:]; but the Torah has not decreed the death penalty for this man, but rather that he be sent into exile. Thus a ... v'yatza leton ... ch'enyon ... teaches us that the unintentional murderer has been singled out for lenient treatment, and his exile is INSTEAD of the death penalty, not IN ADDITION to it.

10) (a ... v'yatza leton ... shelo ch'enyon ...) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to discuss a provision not similar to the general category, has been singled out both to be more lenient and more severe;

A ... v'yatza leton ... shelo ch'enyon ... is also best presented by an example from the Torah: The Torah, after concluding the rules governing a Jewish servant, and stating that the Jewish servant is to go free after six years of service [Exodus 21:1 Now these are the judgments which thou shalt set before them. 2 If thou buy an Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve: and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. 3 If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself: if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. 4 If his master have given him a wife, and she have born him sons or daughters; the wife and her children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself. 5 And if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free: 6 Then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall also bring him to the door, or unto the door post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an aul; and he shall serve him for ever.] -- the Torah next discusses a Jewish maidservant who, logically should have been included in the laws of the Jewish manservant. But, Torah instead states that her road to freedom is completely different from the path of a manservant. The leniency -- the fact that she may go free even BEFORE six years of service (IF she begins puberty, or her master dies), also comes with a stringency, as her master can betroth her -- against her will -- to either himself, or to his son [Exodus 21:7 And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as the menservants do. 8 If she please not her master, who hath betrothed her to himself, then shall he let her be redeemed: to sell her unto a strange nation he shall have no power, seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. 9 And if he have betrothed her unto his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. 10 If he take him another wife; her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage, shall he not diminish. 11 And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money.]

11) (a ... v'yatza ledon ...) "anything that was included in a general statement, but was then singled out to be treated as a new case, cannot be returned to its general statement unless Scripture returns it explicitly to its general statement;

A Kohen's family is entitled to eat terumah (the priest's tithe), but should his daughter marry someone who is not a Kohen, she may no longer eat terumah [Leviticus 22:11 But if the priest buy any soul with his money, he shall eat of it, and he that is born in his house: they shall eat of his meat. 12 If the priest's daughter also be married unto a stranger, she may not eat of an offering of the holy things.] But what if she were to be widowed or divorced, and then returned to her father's house? She would not have been allowed to eat terumah, except for the fact that the Torah specifically allows her to return to the familial unit [Leviticus 22:13 But if the priest's daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned unto her father's house, as in her youth, she shall eat of her father's meat: but there shall no stranger eat thereof.]

12) (a davar halamad maenyon) "a matter elucidated from its context, or from the following passage;

In the Ten Commandments, Torah commands us not to steal [Exodus 20:15 Thou shalt not steal.]. Our Sages, upon examining the context of the command, derive that the theft in question MUST be a capital offense, since the command not to steal is preceded by the commands not to kill, or commit adultery [Exodus 20:13 Thou shalt not kill. 14 Thou shalt not commit adultery. 15 Thou shalt not steal.]. There is only one mode of theft for which the perpetrator receives the death penalty -- that is to kidnap a Jew and force him to work as a slave. Thus "You shall not steal" refers to kidnapping.

Another form of a davar halamad maenyon is a davar halamad mesofo. This rule helps with clarification within within contexts. Example: [Leviticus 14:34 When ye be come into the land of Canaan, which I give to you for a possession, and I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possession; 35 And he that owneth the house shall come and tell the priest, saying, It seemeth to me there is as it were a plague in the house:] The Torah first teaches that a home found to have a "leprous" spot must be torn down. But within context, reading towards the end of the passage [Leviticus 14:36ff.], the Torah tells us about the cleansing of the home's stone, wood and mortar; thus we derive that this law applies only to homes made of stone, wood, and mortar.

13) (a sh'nai ch'suvim ...) "similarly, two passages that contradict one another -- until a third passage comes to reconcile them."

This final rule helps when we come across two verses that are seemingly contradicting each other. But, according to a sh'nai ch'suvim ... we merely are missing a third verse which will clarify the two "contradictory" verses and allow us to see that they are intended for different applications. Example: After G-d commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and then had Abraham remove Isaac from the altar unharmed, Abraham asked G-d to explain the contradiction in what had just occurred. First, G-d had promised Abraham that Isaac would be the forefather of the nation of Israel [Genesis 21:12 And God said unto Abraham, Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad, and because of thy bondwoman; in all that Sarah hath said unto thee, hearken unto her voice; for in Isaac shall thy seed be called.] Then G-d commanded Abraham to offer Isaac as a sacrifice [Genesis 22:2 And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.] G-d explained to Abraham that He had commanded Abraham to 'place Isaac on the altar,' but not to 'slaughter' him upon it. [see Midrash to Genesis 22:12 And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.] Thus, we now see that there was indeed no contradiction.

Learning Hebrew

HOW TO LEARN
Pe’ah 1:1:....
Yerushalmi, Rosh Hashanah 3:5:....
Proverbs 8:11 for wisdom is better than jewels, and all that you may desire cannot compare with her. 
w/Moed Katan 9b:....

Torah from (vtruv)[hora’ah] = "teaching"
(vkcev ,kaka)[shalsheles hakabalah] = "chain of tradition"
(htr,cf vfkv)[halakhah c’vasra’ae] = "the Halakhah is in accordance with later authorities"
(tb, itn)[maan tanna] = "which Tanna is the author of the opinion expressed in this Mishnah?"
(uvbhnru)[urmeinhu] = "cast; throw them" (a contradiction between a Mishnah & Baraisa)
(thae tpud tv)[ha gufa kashya] = "this in itself is contradictory" (a contradiction within a single Mishnah)

Principles of Talmudic Inquiry
The FIRST PRINCIPLE of Talmudic Inquiry: We accept the Mishnayos and the teachings of the Early Amoraim incontrovertibly and beyond question.  We hold this opinion of their authority NOT based upon scholarship, but because their teachings and codifications were under Divine guidance. (Deuteronomy 17:8 If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates: then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the LORD thy God shall choose; 9 And thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and enquire; and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment: 10 And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place which the LORD shall choose shall shew thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: 11 According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left. 12 And the man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the LORD thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die: and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. 13 And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.)
The Second Principle of Talmudic Inquiry: Every word of the Mishnah and the Amoraim is to be accepted as authoritative, each word being weighed, and conclusions drawn from each of the Mishnayos were thoroughly though through.  Even the actions of the Amoraim are to be viewed as both moral and ethical, and we are to learn from how they conducted their lives.  When learning a Mishnah, we are to consider each word, even the omission of a word, as well as how the words are used and ordered.  These elements define the dictum in Talmud study known as (****) "precision".  The true Torah scholar does more than just a memorize facts -- he lives what he has mastered.  Such a Sage is a walking example of "Torah In Action".  He is to be studied and emulated.  As is stated in Avodah Zarah 19b: "Even the mundane conversation of the scholars deserves study."
The Third Principle of Talmudic Inquiry:  There is, within the Mishnayos, a common thread that runs throughout, and one should, when attempting to understand a Mishnah, seek out what is in common rather than augmenting what divides the differing opinions within a Mishnah or Mishnayos.  The Talmud is a work that seeks out difficulties with the desire to resolve them.  Thus we need to learn the Talmud with a sense of congruity, rather that incongruity.  There are two ways in which this Principle is manifest:
1)  While differentiating between sources, the Talmud's goal is to draw as narrow as possible the differences between the disputants, and often we find that the disagreement is based upon slightly different situations in which a small point could be understood in differing ways.
2)  The Talmud desires to explain the Mishnah, or the words of the Amoraim, with language that indicates not that the opinion expressed is that of an individual, but rather that the Talmud wished to express a viewpoint that is consistent with all opinions (****) "according to everyone".  Only in special circumstances does the Talmud define opinions along the lines of "preexisting, differing viewpoints."
The Fourth Principle of Talmudic Inquiry:  Everything found within the Mishnah/Gemorah has significant meaning.  Nothing is repeated unless there is reason to do so.  Nothing, that cannot be deduced through logic, or from known facts is stated.  Neither are well known items related in the text unless there is a new or unusual detail to make known.  Those simplicities that are related, drawn questions such as (****) "Surely this is obvious", or (****) "What is he trying to tell us?"  The answer usually being: () "It was necessary to teach us....", thus depicting that the apparent statement was indeed made of necessity.  The Talmud was written in such a way, and in such language as to assure us that if we strive diligently, we will come to the correct conclusion.
    The question: () "Must we say that this difference is like that between Tannaim?" is one question that the Talmud goes to great lengths NOT to answer in the affirmative.  The Talmud endeavors to depict that differences of opinion between the Tannaim and Amoraim are not the same as differences between two Tannaaim or two Amoraim  by noting distinctions between the two opinions.

The Talmud's Structure... 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharon (p1. Acharonim): A later halachic authority contemporary with or after the time of the Shulchan Aruch.
Agudah: Commentary, with brief halachic decisions, to the whole of the Talmud; by R. Alexander
Suslin Ha-Koheyn; d. 5109 (1349).
Ahavas Chesed: An explanation of the virtue of kindness, its laws, importance and how to attain it; by R. Yisra'el Meir Ha-Koheyn, author of the Mishnah Berurah; 5598-5693(1838-1933); p. Warsaw, 5648 (1888).
Aruch: Explanation of words that appear in the Tannaitic or Amoraitic literature; by R. Nasan B. Yechiel of Rome; 4795-4866 (1035-1106).
Amora (p1. Amoraim): A halachic authority of the times of the Gemara.
Aruch Ha-Shulchan: Commentary and code of Jewish law following the framework of the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Yechiel Michel Epstein; 5589-5668 (1829-1908); p. Piotrkow, 5663-5667 (1903-1907).
Avodah Zarah: A Talmudic tractate.
Bach = Bayis Chadash: Commentary to the Tur; by R. Yoel Sirkes; 5321-5400 (1561-1640); p. Krakow, 53915400 (1631-1640).
Bartenurah: Commentary to the Mishnah; by R. Ovadyah Bertinoro; c. 5210-before 5276 (1450-1516); p. Krakow, 5302 (1542).
Bava Kama: A Talmudic tractate.
Bava Basra: A Talmudic tractate.
Beis Meir: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Meir Pozner; 5489-5567 (1729-1807) p. Frankfort-on-the-Main, 5547 (1787).
Beraysa: A Tannaitic ruling that was not incorporated in the Mishnah.
Beytzah: A Talmudic tractate.
Beyur Ha-Gra: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Eliyahu of Vilna ("The Vilna Gaon"); 5480-5558 (1720-1797); p. Shklov, 5563 (1803).
Beyur Halachah: Additional comments and more detailed studies by the author of the Mishnah Berurah.
B.H.G. = Ba'al Halachos Gedolos (author of the Halachos Gedolos): See Halachos Gedolos.
Birkey Yosef: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim; by R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai ("The Chida"); 5484-5566 (1724-1806); p. Livorno, 5534 (1774).
B.Y. = Beis Yosef: Commentary to the Tur; by R. Yosef Karo, author of the Shulchan Aruch; 5248-5335 (1488-1575); p. Venice, 5310-5311 (1550-1551).
Ch.A. = Chayei Adam: Laws concerning daily conduct, prayers, blessings, Shabbos and Holidays, etc.; by R. Avraham Danzig; 5508-5580 (1748-1820); p. Vilna, 5570 (1810).
Chaehmas Adam: Laws concerning forbidden foods, idolatory, vows, family life, etc.; by R. Avraham Danzig; 5508-5580 (1748-1820); p. Vilna, 5572 (1812).
Chak Ya'akov: Laws and commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Pesach; by R. Ya'akov Reischer; c. 5430-5493 (1670-1733); p. Dessau, 5456 (1696).
Chasam Sofer: Responsa; by R. Moshe Sofer; 5522-5599(1762-1839); p. Pressburg and Munkacs, 5615-5672 (1855-1912).
Chavas Da'as: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah; by R. Ya'akov Lorbeerbaum; 5520-5592 (1760-1832); p. Lwow, 5559 (1799).
Chidushey Ha-Ran: Commentary to the Talmud; by R. Nissim B. Reuven of Gerona; 5070-5135 (1310-1375). 
Chidushey Rabbi Akiva Eiger: Commentary to the Talmud; by R. Akiva Eiger (Eger); 5521-5597 (1761-1837); p. Berlin, 5618 (1858).
Choshen Mishpat: One of the four parts of the Shulchan Aruch.
Chullin: A Talmudic tractate.
Derishah: Commentary to the Tur (companion to the Perishah); by R. Yehoshuah Ha-Koheyn Falk; 5315-5374 (1555-1614); p. Berlin and Lublin, 5395-5527 (1635-1767).
Devarim: The Book of Deuteronomy.
D. Hach. = Derech Ha-Chayim: Glosses to the siddur (prayerbook) containing laws pertaining to daily conduct, prayers, blessings, Shabbos and Holidays, etc.; by R. Ya'akov Lorbeerbaum; 5520-5592 (1760-1832); p. Berlin, 5600 (1840).
D.M. = Darkei Mosheh: Glosses to the B. Y..; by R. Mosheh Isserles ("The Rema") c. 5290-5332 (1530-1572); p. Furth, 5520 (1760).
E.R. = Elya Rabba = Eliyahu Rabba: Commentary to the Levush and Shulchan Aruch; by R. Eliyahu Shapira; 5420-5472 (1660-1712); p. Sulzbach, 5517 (1757).
Eyruvin: A Talmudic tractate.
Gaon (p1. Geonim): The great scholars after the time of the Gemara until the period of the Rishonim; also, any outstanding scholar.
Gemara: The part of the Talmud which discusses and interprets the Mishnah and related matters.
Gra = Gaon Rabbeinu Eliyahu ("The Vilna Gaon"): Halachic authority and author; 5480-5558 (1720-1797). References are usually to his Beyur Ha-Gra (see entry).
Graz = Gaon Rabbeinu Shneyur Zalman of Lyady: Halachic authority and author; 5505-5573 (1745-1813). The references are to his "Shulchan Aruch", a code of laws following the framework of the Shulchan Aruch and incorporating the rulings of the later authorities; p. Kopys, 5574(1814).
Gur Aryeih: Super-commentary to the commentary of Rashi to the Torah; by R. Yehudah Loew ("The Maharal"); c. 5272-5369 (1512-1609); p. Prague, 5338 (1578).
Ha-Gra = The Gra: See Gra.
Halachos Gedolos: An early code of laws from the time of the Geonim whose authorship is unclear.
Kal Bo: A code of Jewish law; by an unknown Rishon.
Kerisos: A Talmudic tractate.
K.M. = Kesef Mishneh: A commentary to the Rambam; by the author of the Shulchan Aruch R. Yosef Karo; 5248-5335 (1488-1575); p. Venice, 5334-5336 (1574-1576).
Levush: Code of laws following the framework of the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Mordechai Jaffe; c.5295-5372 (1535-1612); p. Lublin, Prague, Krakow, 5350-5364 (1590-1604).
M.A. = Magen Avraham: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Avraham Abeli Gombiner; c. 5397-5443 (1637-1683); p. Dyhernfurth, 5452 (1692).
Mach. Hash = Machatzis Ha-Shekel: Commentary to the Magen Avraham; by R. Shemuel Ha-Levi Kelin; 5480-5566 (1720-1806); p. Wien, 5567 (1807).
Maharal = R. Yehudah Loew of Prague: Author of numerous commentaries on Halachah and Aggadah and other Torah works; c. 5285-5369 (1525-1609).
Maharash = R. Shalom B. Yitzchak: Halachic authority who taught the Maharil.
Maharay = R. Yisrael Isserlein: Author of halachic works; 5150-5220 (1390-1460).
Mahari Bey Rav = R. Ya'akov Berab (Beirav): Halachic authority who taught the author of the Shulchan Aruch; C. 5234-5301 (1474-1541).
Maharikash = R. Ya'akov Kastro: Halachic authority and author; c. 5285-5370 (1525-1610).
Maharil = R. Ya'akov Ha-Levi Molin: Halachic authority and author; 5120-5187(1360-1427).
Maharshal = R. Shelomoh Luria: Halachic authority and author and contemporary of the Rema; c. 5270-5334 (1510-1574).
Ma'or: A work in which the author disputes some of the rulings of the Rif; by R. Zerachya B. Yitzchak Ha-Levi of Gerona (12th century).
Meehilta: A halachic Midrash to Shemos.
Meiri: R. Menachem B. Shelomoh, author of an extensive commentary to the Talmud; 5009-5076 (1249-1316).
Midrash: Any of several works consisting of expositions of the Scriptures by the Tannaim and Amoraim.
Migdal Oz: A commentary to the Rambam by R. ShemTov B. Avraham Ibn Gaon (13th and 14^th century).
Milehamos: A work which defends the Rif against the criticisms of the Ma 'or; by R. Mosheh B. Nachman ("The Ramban"); 4954-5030 (1194-1270).
Mishnah: The oral law, compiled and committed to writing by "Rabbi" (see entry).
M.M. = Ma-amar Mordechai: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Mordechai Karmi; 5509-5585 (1749-1825); p. Livorno, 5544 (1784).
Mordechai: Halachic digest of the Talmud and early authorities; by R. Mordechai B. Hillel Ashkenazi; 5000-5058 (1240-1298).
Mor U-Ketzi'ah: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Ya'akov Emden; 5457-5536(1697-1776); p. Altona, 5521 (1761).
N.A. = Nishmas Adam: The rationale of the author of the Chayei Adam underlying his original decisions in the latter work; p. Vilna, 5570 (1810); see Chayei Adam.
Nachalas Tzvi: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Tzvi Hirsh B. Yosef Ha-Koheyn; p. Krakow, 5406 (1646).
Nechemyah: The Book of Nehemiah.
Nesiv Chayim: Glosses and corrections to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Nesanel Weil; 5447-5529 (1687-1769); p. Furth, 5539 (1779).
Nezer Ha-Kodesh = Nezer Yisraeyl Mikra Kodesh: Laws of Shabbos and Eyruvin; by R. Yisrael Matisyahu Auerbach; b. 5598 (1838); p. Lwow, 5638 (1878).
Noda Bi-Yehudah: Responsa; by R. Yechezke'el Landau; 5473.5553(1713-1793); p. Prague, 5536-5571 (1776-1811).
O.Ch. = Orach Chayim: One of the four parts of the Shulchan Aruch, the part to which the Mishnah Berurah is a commentary.
O.Sh. = Olas Shabbos: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Shabbos; by R. Shemuel B.Yosef; d. 5460 (1700); p. Amsterdam, 5434 (1674).
O.Z. = Or Zaru'ah: Commentary to the Talmud, by R. Yitzchak of Wien; c. 4940-c. 5010 (1180-1250).
P.Ch. = Pen Chadash: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Chizkiyah Da Silva; 5419-5455 (1659-1695); p. Amsterdam, 5452-5490 (1692-1730).
Perishah: Commentary to the Tur (companion to the Derishah); by R. Yehoshuah Ha-Koheyn Falk; 5315-5374 (1555-1614); p. Berlin and Lublin, 5395-5527 (1635-1767).
Piskey Ha-Tosafos: A work which lists the decisions of the Tosafos. It is not clear who was the Rishon who authored this work.
P.M. = Pen Megadim: A pair of commentaries, Eyshel Avraham, to the Magen Avraham, and Mishbetzos Zahav, to the Turey Zahav; by R. Yosef Teomim; c. 5487-5552 (1727-1792); p. Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 5545 (1785).
Poseyk (p1. Poskim): Halachic authority.
P.T. = Pisehey Teshuvah: A digest of responsa, etc. relevant to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Tzvi Hirsch Eisenstadt; p. Vilna, 5596 (1836).
Ra'avad = R. Avraham B. David: Halachic authority and author who wrote glosses to the Rambam; 4880-4958 (1120-1198).
Rabbah: An Amora.
Rabbeinu Tam: R. Ya'akov B. Meir, one of the most quoted authorities in the Tosafos; c. 4860-4931 (1100-1171).
"Rabbi": Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nasi. The Tanna who compiled the Mishnah.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Eger): Halachic authority and author; 5521-5597 (1761-1837).
Rabbi Meir: A Tanna.
Rabbi Yehudah: A Tanna.
Rabbi Yosef Karo: Author of the Shulchan Aruch and other works; 5248-5335 (1488-1575).
Rach = Rabbeinu Chananeil B. Chushieil: Early halachic authority, author of a commentary to the Talmud, d.c. 4815 (1055).
Ramach: A Rishon quoted by the Kesef Mishneh, probably R. Meir Ha-Koheyn of Saragossa.
Rambam = R. Mosheh B. Maimon: Author of a code of laws that covers every field of Jewish law and many other works; also described as Maimonides; 48954964 (1135-1204).
Ramban = R. Mosheh B. Nachman: Halachic authority and author; also described as Nachmanides; 4954-5030(1194-1270).
Ram of Rothenburg = R. Meir B. Baruch of Rothenburg: Halachic authority; C. 4975-5053 (1215-1293).
Ran = R. Nissim B. Reuven of Gerona: Halachic authority, author of a commentary to the Rif and other works; 5070-5135 (1310-1375).
Rashal = R. Shelomoh Luria: See Maharshal.
Rashba = R. Shelomoh B. Avraham Adret: Halachic authority and author; c. 4995-c. 5070 (1235-1310).
Rashi = R. Shelomoh Yitzehaki: Author of the basic commentary to the Scriptures and the Talmud; 4800-4865 (1040-1105).
Rema = R. Moshe Isserles: Author of the glosses to the Shulchan Aruch and numerous other works; 5290-5332 (1530-1572).
Rif = R. Yitzchak Al-Fasi: Early Rishon, who gave the rulings of the discussions in the Talmud; 4773-4863 (1013-1103).
Ri Halevi = R. Ya'akov B. Yisrael Ha-Levi: Author of responsa; d. 5396 (1636). The reference is to his responsa; p. Venice, 1374 (1614).
Rishon (p1. Rishonim): An early halachic authority. The period of the Rishonim stretches from the time of the Geonim until the time of the Shulchan Aruch.
Rivash = R. Yitzchak B. Sheyshes: Halachic authority and author; 5086-5168 (1326-1408).
Rokeyach: Halachic work; by R. Elazar of Worms; c. 4925-c. 4990 (1165-1230).
Rosh = Rabbeinu Asher B. Yechiel: Halachic authority and author; c. 5010-5087 (1250-1327).
Sefer Ha-Terumos: The work Sefer Ha-Terumah quoted inaccurately. (The well-known work by this name deals with monetary law.)
Sh.A. = Shulchan Aruch: A work which contains the halachic decisions deriving from the longer discussions by the same author in the Beis Yosef, his commentary to the Tur. It was written by R. Yosef Karo (5248-5335 (1488-1575)) who divided it into four parts, Orach Chayim, Yoreh Dc 'ah, Choshen Mishpat and Even Ha-Ezer; p. Venice, 5325 (1565).
Sha'agas Aryeih: Responsa;by R.Aryeh Leib Gunzberg; 5455-5545 (1695-1785); p. Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 5515 (1755).
Sha'ar Ha-Tziyun: Sources and notes to the Mishnah Berurah; by its author.
S.Hat.:= Sefer Ha-Terumah: Halachic work; by R. Baruch B. Yitzchak of Worms (12th and 13th century).
Shelah = Sheney Luchos Ha-Bris: Esoteric, ethical and halachic work; by R. Yeshayah Ha-Levi Horowitz; c. 5325-5390 (1565-1630); p. Amsterdam, 5408 (1648).
Shemos: The Book of Exodus.
Shevus Ya'akov: Responsa; by R. Ya'akov Reischer; c. 5430-5493 (1670-1733); p. Halle, 5470 (1710).
Sh.G. = Shiltey Giborim: Commentary to the Rif; by R. Yehoshua Boaz (16th century); p. Sabbioneta, 5314 (1554).
Shiyurey Berachah: Glosses to and omissions from his works Birkey Yosef and Machazik Berachah; by R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai; 5484-5566 (1724-1806); p. Salonika, 5574 (1814).
Sh.T. = Sha.T. = Sha'arey Teshuvah: Digest of responsa, etc. relating to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Chayim Mordechai Margolis; p. Dubno, 5580 (1820).
Shulehan Atzey Shitim: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Shabbos and Holidays; by R. Shelomoh Chelma; 5477-5541 (1717-1781); p. Berlin, 5517 (1757).
Talmud: The Mishnah together with the expanded discussions and interpretations of the Gemara.
Talmud Yerushalmi: The Jerusalem Talmud, as opposed to the Babylonian Talmud which is the Talmud ordinarily referred to.
Tanna (p1. Tannaim): A halachic authority of the times of the Mishnah.
Targum Yerushalmi: An early Aramaic translation of the Scriptures.
Taz = Turey Zahav: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. David Ha-Levi of Lwow; 5346-5427 (1586-1667); p. Dyhernfurth, 5452 (1692). Also called Magen David.
Tehillim: The Book of Psalms.
T. Had. = Terumas Ha-Deshen: by R. Yisrael Isserlein; 5150-5220 (1390-1460); p. Venice, 5279 (1519).
Tiferes Yisrael: Commentary to the Mishnah; by R. Yisrael Lipschutz; 5542-5620 (1782-1860); p. Hanover, Danzig, Konigsburg, 5590-5610 (1830-1850).
Tosafos: Talmudic commentary, containing the views of the early European Rishonim, especially of the first few generations after Rashi.
Tosefes Yerushalayim: Laws from the Tosefta and Talmud Yerushalmi not quoted in the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Yisrael Isar Isserlein; p. Vilna, 5631(1871).
Tosefta: A compilation of Tannaitic rulings not incorporated in the Mishnah. It is printed at the end of many editions of the Talmud.
To.Sh. = Tosafos (or Tosefes) Shabbos: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Shabbos; by R. Rafael Meizlisch; p. Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 5527 (1767).
Tur: Code of laws which formed the basis for the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Ya'akov B. Asher, son of the Rosh; c. 5030-5100 (1270-1340).
Vayikra: The Book of Leviticus.
Yad Aharon: Commentary to the Shulchan Aruch; by R. Aharon Alfondari; c. 5450-5534(1690-1774); p. Izmir, 5495 (1735).
Y.D. = Yoreh De'ah: One of the four parts of the Shulchan Aruch.
Yehoshuah: The Book of Joshua.
Yerushalmi = Talmud Yerushalmi: See Talmud Yerushalmi.
Yeshayahu: The Book of Isaiah.
Y. Sh.Sh. = Yam Shel Shelomoh: Halachic commentary to the Talmud; by R. Shelomoh Luria; c. 5270-5334 (1510-1574); p. Prague, Lublin, Krakow, Altona, Berlin, 5375 (1615) onwards.
Zohar: A Kabbalistic Midrash